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and the Development of the
-y conferring on the President the title of "commander
in chief," the Constitution created an awkward
and undefined area of presidential prerogative. The first
President to have to confront this ambiguity was Abraham
Lincoln, who developed a presidential "war powers" doc-
trine based on his presidential oath, the Constitution's "re-
publican guarantee," and the necessity imposed by the
novelty of a civil war. This doctrine was seriously contested
in Lincoln's time by both Congress and the judiciary, and it
continues to be an unresolved constitutional question in the
present. But Lincoln's use of such war powers is one demon-
stration of how a doctrine aimed at awarding the President
unilateral powers to override civil liberties safeguards need
not create a lethal threat to democratic and constitutional
government. f) 61,,.
n the day that Charles Sumner heard about the firing
on Fort Sumter, he immediately took himself to the
White House to tell Abraham Lincoln (as Sumner would
tell the President so many more times during the course
of the next two years) that the war had delivered slavery
into the President's hands for destruction. Why the Civil
War-not Congress or the state legislatures-should be
the mechanism for emancipation came down to two
words: "I ... told him," Sumner said, "that under the war
power the right had come to him to emancipate the
slaves." And if Lincoln had pressed Sumner for more de-
tails, the President would have learned that Sumner be-
lieved that the President's warpower gave him more than
just the opportunity to emancipate slaves. Sumner argued
that the war power of the President-
... is above the Constitution, because, when set in
motion, it knows no other law. ... The civil power,
in mass and in detail, is superseded, and all rights
are held subordinate to this military magistracy. All
other agencies, small and great, executive, legisla-
tive, and even judicial, are absorbed in this tran-
scendent triune power, which, for the time, declares
its absolute will, while it holds alike the scales of
justice and the sword of the executioner. 1
"The existence of this power," Sumner triumphantly
concluded, is something "nobody questions." 2 People
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might have said that it was typical of Charles Sumner to
announce as an accepted fact something that very few
people understood and one that still fewer agreed upon.
The lack of agreement began with the very term, "war
power," which, inconveniently for Sumner's argument,
does not even exist in the Constitution that Sumner be-
lieved it superseded. And the debate about the term ran
from that moment through the four most pressing issues
of the Civil War: the suspension of habeas corpus; the
confiscation of rebels' property; the imprisonment and tri-
al of rebel sympathizers and Northern dissidents; and, ul-
timately, the emancipation of the slaves. And the debate
continued-and continues to this day-to run through the
seizures of German property during both world wars, de-
tention of the Nisei in 1942, Truman's nationalization of
the steel industry, the Vietnam War, the failed Iranian
hostage rescue, Lebanon, Grenada, and the gates of
Guantanamo Bay. Despite the passing of 140 years,
Supreme Court opinions, and the War Powers Act of 1973,
we are, in fact, no closer to a comprehensive definition of
the war powers of the presidency than Charles Sumner
was in 1861. And so it might be instructive to take this
opportunity to see in what ways Abraham Lincoln thought
it was possible to take Sumner's advice.
The Constitution splits the responsibility for war: Article
I, § 8, gives Congress the power to announce the legal state
of war (in other words, to "declare War") and to authorize
the raising of an army and a navy, to supervise the state
militias, and to "provide for" calling out those militias "to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions"; but Article II, § 2, lodges the responsibility
for putting those forces into play in an entirely different
branch of the government-the President, who shall be
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States." And once such
wars were over, the power to conclude peace was also
split: the President was given the power to "make Treaties,"
but only with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Di-
viding the power to wage war between the legislative
branch and the executive branch looked odd against the
background of the English past, where the making of both
war and peace were prerogatives of the Crown. However,
the split made sense to the architects of the Constitution,
who had been bred on John Locke's division of govern-
mental powers into domestic (governed by the legislature)
and the "federative" (the relations between a society and
other nations, which Locke confined to the executive
branch). The framers were also convinced that "the history
of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue, which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind ...
to the sole disposal of a ... president of the United States."3
But supposing that the power to make war actually
could, according to this new model, be divided between
Congress and the presidency, what exactly were the pow-
ers comprehended under the President's title of "Comman-
der in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States"? And no one had
any very clear answer. In discussing the powers of the
presidency in his celebrated Commentaries, Chancellor
James Kent never breathed a word about any "war pow-
ers." In fact, Kent limited the operation of wartime powers
of seizure and confiscation to an act of Congress. Alexan-
der Hamilton, in the Federalist, No. 69, believed that the
office of commander in chief "would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the mil-
itary and naval forces, as the first general and admiral of
the Confederacy," but he saw this is little more than acting
as a sort of general coordinator of military actions-similar
to the power that "the governor of New York" exercised
over the militia-rather than serving as a military officer in
direct command of armies in the field. And the venerable
Justice Joseph Story actually believed that Congress ought
to pass a consent resolution before allowing a president to
take up personal military command. But in 1795, George
Washington took the commander in chief title literally and
rode out at the head of United States forces (with Hamil-
ton at his side) to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. Similar-
ly, when the HMS Leopard shot up the U.S. frigate Chesa-
peake in 1807 for refusing an order to heave to and allow
a search of the American crew for British "deserters,"
Thomas Jefferson immediately took steps to purchase mili-
tary supplies entirely on his own authority as President.4
The nearest legal cognate to the war powers of the
President was martial law, but even here, the parallels
were almost useless. In fact, there was only one signifi-
cant example of the American use of martial law, and it
did not bode well for any attempt to create a broad-based
doctrine of presidential war powers. In December 1814,
Gen. Andrew Jackson proclaimed a state of martial law in
New Orleans, thereby suspending the writ of habeas cor-
pus and imposing a curfew, a civilian draft, and a require-
ment that any movements in or out of the city be regis-
tered with his adjutant-general. Federal District Judge Do-
minick Hall defied Jackson, and Jackson expelled Hall
from the city. But when news of the Treaty of Ghent ar-
rived in New Orleans on March 13, 1815, Hall promptly
cited Jackson for contempt of court and fined him; Secre-
tary of War Alexander Dallas unsympathetically advised
Jackson to pay the fine. As Jackson learned, the use of
martial law-which chiefly involved suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus and closure of the civil courts, tem-
porary seizures of property, and rule by the military-
stuck grotesquely in American throats as a throwback to
British tyranny.5 Martial law, wrote Supreme Court Justice
Levi Woodbury in 1849, could be used by "a commanding
officer of troops" only to govern his "camp" and "its envi-
rons and the near field of his military operations," but not
an inch beyond. "The writ of habeas corpus ... is as much
in force in intestine war as in peace," Woodbury declared,
"and the empire of the laws is equally to be upheld. 6
But not without opinions, however. In 1842, John
Quincy Adams had warned Southerners that, in the event
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of a slave insurrection or a war with Great Britain, Con-
gress had the "full and plenary power" to emancipate
slaves if it thought such an emancipation would be useful
in restoring national order or repelling invasion. "It is a
war power," and even though that power had never actu-
ally been "called into exercise under the present Constitu-
tion of the United States," it was "a settled maxim of the
law of nations" that, in time of war, "the military super-
sedes the civil power."7 Adams made no attempt to ex-
plain whether he thought this "war power" belonged
jointly or separately to Congress or the President; at times,
Adams seemed to be doing nothing more than justifying
the use of martial law as a weapon of emancipation. That
was enough for Charles Sumner, though, who liked to
think of himself as Adams' Elisha: 19 years to the day af-
ter Adams' "war powers" speech, Sumner was in Abraham
Lincoln's office, beseeching the President to do what
Adams had done.
,--.mner liked to boast that he was "the first, who in our
-- day, called for this exercise of power." This claim,
strictly speaking, was not true. William Lloyd Garrison is-
sued a pamphlet-sized reprint of John Quincy Adams'
speeches on war powers in order to make his case, and
Adams' son, Charles Francis Adams (whom Lincoln would
pick to represent the United States as American minister to
Great Britain) agreed that "under the war power we can do
what is ... necessary for the purposes of the war, as justi-
fied by humanity, good sense, and the consent of Christen-
dom. I know no other limits."8 Necessity, however, could
take a number of astonishing forms: military tribunals act-
ing under different rules of justice than civil courts, arrests
without warrants and imprisonment without trials, surveil-
lance, and (even if indirectly) intimidation of the press.
Nor was it clear what the appropriate reactions from
the courts should be: Should the courts yield the ground
to executive unilateralism on the grounds that the Presi-
dent and the military have to operate by their own rules
and expertise in time of war, or is it the task of the courts
to exercise a skeptical restraint on executive powers?
Judges, after all, are not soldiers and do not have access to
the information soldiers possess about enemy intentions,
nor are the courts in the position to move as swiftly as the
military does in response to enemy threats. On the other
hand, the very atmosphere of wartime emergency has a
nasty habit of causing public panic and a jittery willingness
to acquiesce when the military begins chipping away at
civil liberties; and the nation's executive and military may
display an equally nasty penchant for ratcheting up their
demands for more powers once one level of special pow-
ers has been conceded. Moreover, this perspective spoke
to only potential conflicts between the executive branch
and the judiciary. What role, if any, should Congress play?
All these questions, wrapped in a combined atmosphere
of novelty and crisis, were presented to Lincoln, Congress,
and the courts in 1861, and it took the first two years of
the Civil War-and Lincoln's increasingly messy and un-
popular use of suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus,
the creation of federal military districts with authority to
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detain and try suspected rebels, the enlistment of volun-
teers and the diversion of funds to equip them without
congressional sanction, the blockade, and, most momen-
tous of all, the emancipation of the. Confederacy's slaves
by presidential proclamation-before a set of specific justi-
fications for the exercise of presidential "war powers" be-
gan to crystallize into a reasonable doctrine.
That doctrine came to rest on three legs: (1) the presi-
dential oath of office, (2) the constitutional requirement to
guarantee the states a republican form of government,
and (3) the dictates of necessity. The "oath" justification
was posed most forcibly in 1863 by a New York lawyer,
Grosvenor Lowrey, who would become more famous af-
ter the war as Thomas Edison's lawyer and fund-raiser.
According to Lowrey, "It is the duty" (and Lowrey wanted
the emphasis placed squarely on the word "duty") "of the
Commander-in-chief to subdue a great number of persons
actively engaged in supporting the war." His oath to "pre-
serve, protect, and defend" obligated Lincoln to use any
and all means to subdue the rebellion, and neglecting the
use of any means to do so would be grounds for im-
peachment. 9 Similarly, Joel Prentiss Bishop, a Boston ju-
rist, argued that Lincoln was obligated to flex the powers
of war because of the Constitution's guarantee "to every
State in this Union" of "a Republican Form of Govern-
ment" (Article IV, § 4). After all, "A republican form of
government implies the voluntary suffrage of the people,"
Bishop reasoned; because such a government did not ex-
ist in rebellious South Carolina, "the Constitution ... lays
its power ... upon the President" and authorizes him to
take any measure that will restore a "Republican Govern-
ment."10 For the radical Republicans in Congress, those
measures could include the creation of "a military tribunal
... to follow the army, and as we conquer their territory,
sell to the highest bidder the lands of every rebel, to mili-
tary occupants, who, with arms in their hands, shall take
resident possession by themselves, or their tenants, and
be ready to defend it against all comers." But it was Ho-
race Greeley, who used the pages of the New York Tri-
bune's short-lived monthly magazine, The Continental
Monthly, to bypass any constitutional niceties and justified
the use of war powers by the president purely on the
grounds of necessity. "Who but a fool would question the
right of a man to strike a dagger to the heart of the assas-
sin whose grasp was on his throat, because there is a law
against the private use of deadly weapons?" the Monthly
asked in its October 1862 issue. Just so in war: the right
of survival overrides any constitutional restraint ordinarily
applied to the President. According to The Continental
Monthly, "In such a time, they must all give way to the
supreme necessity of saving the national existence."1 1
But were the people who questioned the war powers
doctrine really fools?12 Lincoln's own party in Congress
was a good deal less than united over the presidential war
powers doctrine, partly because the radical Republicans
wanted the war powers for themselves, and partly because
a number of moderate Republicans were convinced that
equipping the President with nonconstitutional powers for
the purpose of defending the Constitution might create a
cure worse than the disease. Orville Hickman Browning,
one of Lincoln's closest friends and the Illinois resident ap-
pointed to fill Stephen A. Douglas' empty seat in the Sen-
ate in 1861, balked at "the doctrine ... in favor of absolute
power in the hands of the President, under the name of
Commander-in-Chief," calling it "the most dangerous doc-
trine ever advocated under a constitutional Government.
... Unless we can save the Constitution with the Union,
we had better let them both go." Benjamin Curtis, who
had co-authored the minority dissent in the Dred Scott de-
cision in 1857, did not doubt that Lincoln was "honestly
desirous to do his duty to the country," but Justice Curtis
drew the line at recognizing Lincoln's possession of some
"implied powers of the President as commander-in-chief in
time of war." The title "commander in chief" only allowed
Lincoln to "do what generals in the field are allowed to do
within the sphere of their actual operations." That did not,
however, include the various powers that Lincoln seemed
to be exercising under the rubric of that title. "I do not yet
see that it depends upon his executive decree whether ...
my neighbors and myself ... should be subjected to the
possibility of military arrest and imprisonment, and trial
before a military commission ... " Even Grosvenor Lowrey
had to admit that, even though the war powers "are the
faithful friends and servants of the Constitution, they are
not constitutional powers; and I am compelled to call
them extra-constitutional for want of a better name." 13
And that was only what Lincoln's friends were saying.
Former Whigs (whose party had come into being to op-
pose the armed despotism of Andrew Jackson, the "mili-
tary chieftain"), outright Southern sympathizers, racist
demagogues horrified at the prospect of emancipation,
and Northern Democrats struggling to regain their equilib-
rium after the electoral defeat of 1860-all joined in a wail
of denunciation, complaining that (1) no presidential war
powers existed or had ever existed; (2) if they did exist,
nothing that Lincoln had done qualified as a war power;
and (3) if they did exist, exercising them required the co-
operation of Congress and the judiciary. According to Lin-
coln's opponents on this issue, by ignoring those objec-
tions, Lincoln was a far greater threat to the Constitution
and liberty than the Confederacy was.14 The nonagenari-
an Kentucky jurist Samuel Smith Nicholas was shocked
that any president would think of using "that immemorial
tyrants' plea, necessity," which Nicholas believed the
Founders had "intended to extirpate utterly from our sys-
tem. ... I have not the language to express the surprise,
not to say horror, with which I have witnessed the prom-
ulgation of these opinions." Robert Winthrop, the venera-
ble Massachusetts Whig and one-time Speaker of the
House, agreed that invoking such a thing as "war powers"
was "abhorrent to every instinct of my soul, to every dic-
tate of my judgment, to every principle which I cherish as
a statesman or as a Christian." Joel Parker, the Royall Pro-
fessor of Law at Harvard Law School, upheld Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus in 1861, but he stumbled at
the extension of military powers further than an officer's
"camp ... its environs and the near field of his military
operations." And not only did Parker attack the legitimacy
of issuing a presidential Emancipation Proclamation, but
in 1862 he also launched a failed bid to oust Charles Sum-
ner from his Senate seat. The idea that a president could
emancipate slaves generally across the Confederacy and
declare them "forever free," even after the conclusion of
hostilities, was injecting "the poison of despotic principles
... into the system of the Constitution. ' 15 And Mont-
gomery Throop, a New York lawyer, complained that hav-
ing any such war power in the President's hands "in con-
nection with the power of arbitrary arrests, will give the
Constitution a speedy and effective coup-de-grace." The
Democratic newspaper The Old Guard simply announced:
"There is no such thing as a war power known to this
country." The "war power," complained Philadelphia De-
mocrat Thomas Jefferson Miles, was merely a tool of the
"so-called Republican, but really Abolition party," to si-
lence free speech as part of a "premeditated conspiracy to
destroy the Constitution," the first step of which had been
"the nomination of Abraham Lincoln at Chicago."16
/ ne would have been more surprised at being
, fingered as the figurehead of a conspiracy to im-
pose a war powers despotism than Abraham Lincoln. Lin-
coln had never shared much of Victorian Romanticism's
glorification of men-at-arms; he had burned his fingers as
a member of Congress in 1848 by questioning James K.
Polk's rationale for war with Mexico, and he largely sus-
pected that most of the professional military men of the
republic were Democrats and unsympathetic to his ad-
ministration. Jefferson Davis, Lincoln complained "had
known all the officers of the regular army. I had never
seen but three of them before I came to Washington as
President. '17 Nor, for that matter, did Lincoln ever try to
construct a comprehensive doctrine of presidential war
powers for use in the ways Thomas Jefferson Miles and
Joel Parker feared. If anything, Lincoln's earlier Whig po-
litical inclinations inclined him to defer to Congress in
taking up any national initiatives. "By the Constitution, the
executive may recommend measures which he may think
proper; and he may veto those he thinks Unproper; and it
is supposed he may add to these certain indirect influ-
ences to affect the action of congress." But for more than
that, Lincoln maintained that his "political education
strongly inclines me against a very free use of any of
these means, by the Executive, to control the legislation
of the country. As a rule, I think it better that congress
should originate, as well as perfect its measures, without
external bias."18
What Lincoln did take seriously, however, was his oath
of office, and as Lincoln developed a doctrine of war
powers, this is what became his starting point. "You can
have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggres-
sors," he warned the secessionists in his first Inaugural
Address, "You have no oath registered in Heaven to de-
stroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn
one to 'preserve, protect and defend' it." The oath im-
posed on him a "duty ... to administer the present gov-
ernment, as it came to his hands, and to transmit it, unim-
paired by him, to his successor." Preserving the Union, he
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repeated, is what "the Constitution itself expressly enjoins
upon me," and he wanted to add (but struck out from the
final version) the ominous promise that while secession-
ists "can forbear the assault upon it, I can not shrink from
the defense of it." 19 This was not a particularly aggressive
way of announcing that disunion would be resisted by
whatever means Lincoln decided to use; as in so many of
his key writings, the voice is a passive one, as though he
were being forced into a task he would normally find un-
pleasant were it not for the dictates of the situation. But
anyone who mistook Lincoln's use of the passive voice as
a statement of uncertainty soon learned that his convic-
tion-that the scope of presidential response is narrowed
by the actions of others-made him take the most vigor-
ous forms of action. And anyone who imagined that Lin-
coln took the oath of office as a mere rhetorical formality
would soon discover how painfully dear the idea of hon-
or-of fidelity to promises above all else-was to him. 20
Lincoln did not expect, however, that the oath would
plunge him into civil war. "It shall be my endeavor to pre-
serve the peace of this country so far as it can possibly be
done, consistently with the maintenance of the institutions
of the country," he promised a pre-inaugural crowd in Har-
risburg, Pa. "With my consent, or without my great dis-
pleasure, this country shall never witness the shedding of
one drop of blood in fraternal strife."21 He negotiated
strenuously to avoid a clash over Fort Sumter, even to the
point of promising Alexander Boteler that he would dis-
courage the final session of the 36th Congress from passing
a bill authorizing the militia to be called up.22 And, unlike
Andrew Jackson in 1832, he sent, not an army, but an un-
armed transport to relieve the Sumter garrison--only to
have the Confederates bombard Fort Sumter into submis-
sion before the supplies could reach the fort. Lincoln was
surprised yet again when, under the terms of the Militia Act
of 1795, he called up 75,000 state militia for the statutory
three months of service--only to have the governors of
Delaware and Maryland reply that their militia would be
available for defending only the capital, and the governors
of Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas state
frankly that their militias would "not be furnished to the
powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they
have in view."23 But worst of all, Lincoln had to endure an
agonizing four weeks after the firing on Sumter waiting for
the militia of the Northern states to force their way through
to the capital, while government employees were mustered
to defend the White House, General Winfield Scott sand-
bagged the Treasury building as a last-stand bunker, and
Lincoln's two small sons anxiously built a pitiful little fort of
their own on the White House roof. "All the troubles and
anxieties of his life had not equaled those which inter-
vened between this time and the fall of Sumter," he told
Orville Hickman Browning on July 3, 1861.24 And it was
out of that dilemma that Lincoln grasped the second leg of
the war powers doctrine: necessity.
It was primarily necessity that impelled Lincoln to issue,
after the fiasco of the militia call-up, a call for state volun-
teer units and for an expansion of the regular army (and an
appropriation of funds for equipment). It was also necessi-
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ty that led him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in or-
der to assist in the detention of rebel saboteurs along the
Maryland rail and telegraph lines. 25 Congress was not in
session at the time Fort Sumter was fired on, and it was im-
possible to call a special session before the summer, be-
cause too many congressional districts in the vital border
states were still holding congressional elections through the
spring. "No choice was left but to call out the war power of
the Government." He would not state categorically whether
"these measures" were "strictly legal or not," but they did
meet "a public necessity." After all, it seemed to Lincoln ab-
surd that "all the laws" were to be overthrown by the
rebels, while "the government itself" should "go to pieces"
as the President observed the constitutional requirements
of congressional approval. But necessity was not Lincoln's
only argument: harking back to the sanctity of his oath, he
asked, "In such a case, would not the official oath be bro-
ken, if the government should be overthrown" while Lin-
coln had the power to preserve it by "yielding to partial,
and temporary departures, from necessity?" And, he added
(reaching for the third leg of the war powers doctrine), was
the war power not also mandated by the constitutional
guarantee of "Republican" government? "The Constitution
provides, and all the States have accepted the provision,
that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government."' Secession,
however, was the very antithesis of a republican govern-
-ment, and "to prevent" secession "is an indispensable
means, to the end, of maintaining the guaranty mentioned;
and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the indispensa-
ble means to it, are also lawful, and obligatory." As he con-
fidentially told Lyman Trumbull, he "did not know of any
law to authorize some of the things he had done; but he
thought there was a necessity for them, & that to save the
constitution & the laws generally, it might be better to do
some illegal acts, rather than suffer all to be overthrown."26
Hovering behind these points, however, was a larger,
vaguer notion of constitutional authority--one that could
justify actions that were not just invisible in the Constitu-
tion but actually contradicted its express statements. In
spring 1861, the westernmost counties of Virginia repudiat-
ed the Virginia secession ordinance, organized themselves
as the "restored" government of Virginia, and in May 1862,
petitioned Congress for recognition as an entirely new
state. The West Virginia statehood bill was bitterly op-
posed in Congress by antiadministration Democrats for its
"utter and flagrant unconstitutionality"-and for once, they
could quote an explicit ban in the Constitution: in Article
IV, § 3, which states that existing states cannot be subdi-
vided "without the consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned." This proviso caught Lincoln in a dilemma of
his own manufacturing, because all along he had insisted
that secession was a constitutional impossibility and that,
therefore, Virginia had never legally left the Union--or,
presumably, surrendered its right to consent to its own di-
vision. When the bill finally ended up on Lincoln's desk in
December 1862, Lincoln was so troubled about signing it
that he convened a special cabinet meeting, requiring all
members to submit written opinions, to discuss the issue.
In the end, however, Lincoln signed the bill, and his justifi-
cation was almost cloaked in a form of mysticism. The
West Virginia seceders were, strictly speaking, asking for
something that the Constitution forbade by its letter. But
there was more to the Constitution than the letter of the
law. In 1861, Lincoln reflected on the struggles of the Rev-
olutionary War, and it struck him that "there must have
been something more than common that those men strug-
gled for ... something even more than National Indepen-
dence," and that was the "great promise to all the people
of the world to all time to come"-the promise of democ-
racy itself-"that in due time the weights should be lifted
from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an
equal chance." The Constitution, as he wrote during the
secession winter of 1860-1861, was a means to preserving
that principle, not an end in itself-and certainly not a sui-
cide pact that those opposed to the Union could twist to
its own destruction:
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the
word, "fitly spoken" which has proved an "apple of
gold" to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the
picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The
picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the ap-
ple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was
made for the apple not the apple for the picture.
The West Virginians, by seceding from secession, had
put themselves on the side of the angels, and Lincoln was
not about to punish them for violating the letter of the
Constitution when they had risked so much to save its
spirit. "It is said, the devil takes care of his own," Lincoln
wrote. "Much more should a good spirit-the spirit of the
Constitution and the Union-take care of its own. I think
it can not do less, and live." 27
Overriding the letter of the Constitution in favor of its
democratic spirit was not an argument Lincoln liked to re-
sort to, and using it on this occasion drove his critics to ask
whether this was simply a fancy way of saying that Lincoln
"can proceed step by step to grasp the reins of absolute
power." Even the argument based on necessity was "one of
the most startling exercises of the one-man power-which
the history of human government, free or despotic, ever
witnessed.' 28 And so it went through the course of the war,
as the Lincoln administration proceeded to expand its sus-
pensions of habeas corpus, arrest truculent members of the
Maryland legislature who were agitating for secession, im-
pose an ever-escalating series of conscription measures,
levy direct taxes on incomes, conduct a program of military
arrests that were estimated to have imprisoned 38,000 peo-
ple (including a former U.S. Congressman, Clement Val-
landigham) in 1865, and shut down two Northern newspa-'
pers. "This assumption of power," complained the New
York State Democratic Committee in a public letter in May
1863, "not only abrogates the right of the people ... but it
strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law and the author-
ity of the State and Federal Constitution."29
But did it? Lincoln "was greatly moved-more angry
than I ever saw him," according to Attorney General Ed-
ward Bates in fall 1863, over state judges who freed civil-
ians detained by military tribunals, and the President
frankly believed that these interpositions had more to do
with Democratic resistance to his politics than it did with
concern over the implications of the war powers on civil
liberties. Lincoln "declared that it was a formed plan of
the democratic copperheads, deliberately acted out to de-
feat the Govt., and aid the enemy." As Mark Neely
showed in 1991, the estimates of the military arrests made
under the Lincoln administration were wildly exaggerated;
in fact, the total number of arrests probably amounted to
no more than 13,535, by Neely's reckoning-and of those,
vanishingly few occurred north of the Mason-Dixon Line.
By far, the bulk of Lincoln's military detentions were of
what we today might call "enemy combatants"-British
nationals crewing blockade runners, smugglers, draft riot-
ers, guerrillas-as well as of corrupt war contractors, de-
serters, and bounty jumpers. If anything, Lincoln once re-
marked, people were more likely to look back on the
Civil War and wonder why he didn't exercise the war
powers with a harder hand: "I think the time not unlikely
to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few
arrests rather than too many," Lincoln replied to New
York's Democrats. In fact, rather than stifling liberty, it
was precisely the doctrine of presidential war powers that
gave Lincoln the opening he needed to proclaim emanci-
pation-"by virtue of the power in me vested, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, of the Army, and Navy of the United
States in time of actual armed rebellion against the au-
thority and government of the United States, and as a
proper and necessary war measure"-and thus to dodge
the bullet of a federal court challenge if he had issued the
Emancipation Proclamation as a civil decree. 30
the end, Lincoln's implementation of presidential
war powers went in precisely the opposite direction
from the way his critics had feared it would go. More than
necessity, or the oath, or the republican guarantee (which
might contain little or nothing in the way of self-limita-
tions), it was the constant remembrance in Lincoln's mind
that the war powers were a means, not an end, to the pro-
motion of democracy that kept Lincoln from becoming the
outright dictator that his enemies-and some of his
friends-feared. "I do not intend to be a tyrant," Lincoln
said in 1863 to a delegation of radical Republicans who
wanted more vigorous prosecution of dissidents: "I must
make a dividing-line somewhere between those who are
the opponents of the government and those who only op-
pose peculiar features of my administration while they sus-
tain the government." And when Treasury Secretary Salmon
Chase urged Lincoln to expand the scope of the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation to include the slaves of the border states
as well as those of the Confederacy, Lincoln sharply de-
murred: "The exemptions were made because the military
necessity did not apply to the exempted localities. ... If I
take the step must I not do so, without the argument of
military necessity, and so, without any argument, except
the one that I think the measure politically expedient, and
morally right ... would I not thus be in the boundless field
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of absolutism? '3 1 He frequently reiterated his belief that,
however sweeping his war powers might be, they terminat-
ed the moment the war was over, and after that moment,
he was as subservient to the dictates of Congress and the
courts as anyone else; and this even included the power to
grant emancipation. At the Hampton Roads Peace Confer-
ence in February 1865, he admitted to Alexander H.
Stephens that, once the war was over, emancipation would
become "a judicial question. How the courts would decide
it, he did not know and could give no answer." If the
courts overturned the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln
would have to either acquiesce or resign from office, and,
although he left no doubt what option he would exercise,
forcible presidential resistance was not one of his choic-
es.3 2 And the federal judiciary, for its part, generally stood
aside and refused to use the war as an opportunity to bind
the war powers doctrine too tightly by judicial dictum.
Consistent with Lincoln's pattern of interposing his war
powers only in specific instances, the judiciary set a similar
pattern of avoiding explicit challenges to the war powers.
Even at moments when the Supreme Court has questioned
certain presidential actions, it has done so on grounds oth-
er than the president's claim to have the war powers of a
commander in chief.33
Thus, even without articulating a detailed description
of presidential war powers, Lincoln succeeded in demon-
strating that such war powers could exist outside the nor-
mal boundaries of the Constitution without those powers
automatically destabilizing the Constitution itself. As Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes once remarked, "While we
are at war, we are not in revolution." Neither the Constitu-
tion nor the idea of democracy was so fragile that they
could not survive the taking-up of arms-and of unusual
powers-in their own defense, and especially when those
powers were consigned to the hands of a leader who had
such painstaking reverence for constitutional and demo-
cratic authority. Thaddeus Stevens, who had weighed Lin-
coln so often in the balance and found him wanting for
not exercising his war powers more relentlessly, paid a
tribute to Lincoln (which was difficult for Stevens) de-
scribing him as "the calm statesman ... who will lead you
to an honorable peace and to permanent liberty. ... For
purity of heart and firmness of character he would com-
pare well with the best of the conscript fathers."'34 Lin-
coln's construction of the presidential war powers was
neither as sweeping nor as dictatorial as the jurists feared
or the opposition complained of, and in an ironic way, it
was precisely Lincoln's refusal to press the war powers to
the extent that they feared that may have cost him his life.
He would not surround himself with military escorts, he
remarked to Charles Graham Halpine, because it would
send too imperial a message about his idea of himself as
President. "It would never do for a president to have
guards with drawn sabres at his door, as if he fancied he
were, or were trying to be, or were assuming to be, an
emperor."35 Perhaps, had Lincoln applied those war pow-
ers to his own protection, he might not have come to so
tragic, and so untimely, an end. T'F.
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